By Kendall O Donnell on Tuesday, 29 June 2021
Category: European Union

Why the United States Needs to Re-think Ideas Such as the Wolfowitz Doctrine When Thinking About Dealing with China

A new consensus: Why the United States needs to re-think ideas such as the Wolfowitz Doctrine when thinking about dealing with China 

The U.S.A. is no longer in a position of primacy in the Indo-Pacific; to regain hegemony, it must alter its policies.

U.S foreign policy, ever since the tenure of President Woodrow Wilson and his famous 14 points, has been conducted with the presupposition that the United States is in a position to impose and enforce international law, democratic governance, and geopolitical stability throughout the globe. Indeed, ever since the end of the Great War, the United States and its close allies have held the reigns of primacy worldwide and fought to keep these reigns in hand against the Soviet Union. However, the new threat which faces world stability isn't a dysfunctional, corrupt and outmoded nation and its satellites, like the Soviet Union, but rather a highly centralized, highly efficient and incredibly economically competitive country that is predicted to overtake the United States by 2028 in terms of its economic power, China.

What the Defense Planning Guidance for 1994-1999 laid out (colloquially known as the Wolfowitz Doctrine) was a plan for foreign policy that involved unilateral decision-making that was designed to prevent authoritarian states from reaching superpower status. Often described as being imperialist, this document was written with the possibility of a resurgent Russia in mind, and not a rising China. The speed at which China grew from one of the poorest nations in the world to the globe's second-largest economy insists an equally rapid evolution of U.S foreign policy, with regard to China, from a neo-conservative one to an outlook that can tackle the threats that this superpower poses to the rest of the world. But how would this policy be re-writing the assumptions through which American foreign policy is conducted? And what measures can the U.S. take to protect its interests?

Firstly, it would scrap the notion that the U.S.A. is dominant in the Indo-Pacific region. This is irrefutably true. The United States has allies in the region who are bonded to the United States by shared values, such as Australia, who cannot abide by China's unabashed aggressive expansionism in the South-China Sea, antagonism, and its long list of human rights abuses. The U.S. also has allies who are additionally bound to the United States by shared interests, such as India, who is regarded by China as its future economic competitor and is being made to play a very costly game of catch up with its military by China's recent commissioning of 2 new aircraft carriers and its new vow to enact its fourteenth 5-Year-Plan which involves China rapidly modernizing its military capabilities.

When combined with the Chinese-Indian border disputes in the Kashmir region, the Indian government would feel obliged to meet if not surpass Chinese military investment, even though its military budget is only $73.65 billion, and buying just one retired aircraft carrier would cost around $13 billion – an unattainable goal. The only way to prevent such expense would be to see China back down on its own spending, thus China's economic stagnation, or at least a decrease in the rate of its growth, would very much benefit India. The United States' relationship with its partners in the region is generally an alliance brought about by shared interests and values, both of which are susceptible to shifts and changes. China's relationships with its own partners on the other hand are a product of China's aggressive saber-rattling in its foreign policy and its stranglehold powers thanks to its economic might. The strength of these partnerships is highly unlikely to waver without firm external pressure.

Getting China to reel in its expenses however does not look like something that the world will be seeing anytime soon under the current climate. China is supported in a variety of ways both and home and internationally. Domestically, the CCP has total control of the country and thus can plan its economy years in advance without a change in administration affecting any progress. On the international stage, China has already embarked on its plan of covering vast regions of the globe under its sphere of influence through the successful (for China) Belt and Road initiative. China is responsible for the construction and development of major infrastructure in many LEDC nations such as Sri Lanka for example, a country that is so heavily indebted to China that it's president has been accused of corruption with the Chinese government. This corruption is a widespread theme with all the leaders of countries that currently participate in the Belt and Road initiative. Beijing's supporting of despots in countries has essentially bought China staunch allies who rely on its support and will therefore play along with all of the CCP's plans for global domination to protect their own personal interests, however detrimental to their country their actions may be. A prime example of the latter point is Belarusian dictator Aleksander Lukashenko whose relationship with China is described by Siarhei Bohdan, an analyst at the Minsk-based Ostrogorski Centre, as "China is Lukashenko's main hope for surviving in global politics and finding a more decent position for Belarus in it".

So, the United States, although having some strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, cannot match China's sheer leverage over its own partners and thus the balance of power in the region is unfortunately tilted in China's favor. This is why the U.S.A. needs to swallow its pride and address China as an equal.

The New Marshall Plan

The United States needs to strengthen its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific by pioneering what I would like to call the New Marshall Plan (NMP). Much like a post-World War Two Europe, nations throughout the world are looking for cheap loans to rebuild their economies post-COVID, a crisis that has rocked the world economy to its core. The central purpose to the NMP will be to provide loans to countries that are strategically significant for the Indo-Pacific region, an alternative to other sources of loans, such as the AIIP. Much like the Belt and Road Initiative, the NMP will spread U.S influence quickly and efficiently, forging strong bonds with developing nations – the nations that will be shaping the geopolitical atmosphere for the next 100 years, especially Africa, where rare-earth minerals are proving invaluable in the shift to renewable energy solutions to climate change. Countries already interested in the Belt and Road initiative will further be interested in the NMP by the fact that it was the United States, and not China, that has successfully led the free word for the last 100 years and it is well known for standing up for human rights, democracy and international justice – justice that these undeveloped nations have not been dealt with their dealings with China, a country which has taken advantage of the lack of options presented to such countries through its predatory nature and its opaqueness with regards to its international dealings. The Unites States can offer something that China cannot offer, trustworthiness and transparency.

President Joe Biden has made crystal clear that 'America is back', and although this is clearly a purely political slogan, this message will no doubt resonate with the developing nations who have seen a steady decrease in aid and investment from the U.S. during the Trump administration – President Biden should take advantage of the anticipation that he has built up during his election campaign and get these eager nations onboard with the U.S. and its foreign policy objectives through the NMP.

Making U.S Military Presence Felt with 'Redlining'

The United States also needs to reassess its military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, the U.S. has made its presence clear with military bases in Japan and Korea and through weapons sales to allies such as Taiwan and India including the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system and M1 Abrams tanks. This is, however, insufficient to enforce a 'red-line' in terms of Chinese aggression, aggression which has over the last months led to the Taiwanese military deploying anti-aircraft missiles to monitor Chinese incursions of up to 20 aircraft. The United States and its allies need to make it crystal clear that they will not allow such antagonism to occur.

To achieve this aim, the United States and its regional partners should use a method which has come under fire from both the left and right for the last couple of decades. The creation of new overseas military bases in highly threatened locations would make it crystal clear to any potential aggressor that an attack on the base would be a declaration of war against the United States and its allies and thus the compound would act as a guarantor of sovereignty for the country within which the base is found. An obvious candidate for such investment would have to be The Republic of China, Taiwan, which is at the heart of the issue. Having Taiwan protected by the United States in such a straightforward manner would jeopardize China's 9-Dash Line claims and thus greatly undermine China's legitimacy as a regional superpower vis-à-vis the United States and its strategic partners. China would be forced to recognize that the 9-Dash Line's perspective on Chinese power and sovereignty oversteps reality. 

In addition, providing such assistance to Taiwan should be done with the terms that Taiwan needs to revoke its support of the 9-Dash Line and its constitutional claims over mainland China to avoid further antagonism towards China. The 1992 consensus, although having brought cross-strait dialogue back between Taiwan and China, was clearly only a short-term solution to the 'conflict of objectives' between the two countries. This is something seen by Tsai Ing-wen, the Taiwanese president who in 2019 criticized the idea of 'one country, two systems' and outright rejected it since her tenure began. The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China are two distinct countries and do not overlap in any way except for their fraught temporarily shared history.

Some may criticize such a plan as they do not believe in the validity of such strategy, they see such actions as preludes to actual conflict and aggressive. However, just as Thomas Schelling in his landmark book Arms and Influence wrote about the 7,000 U.S troops stationed in West Berlin during the Cold War, "They represent the pride, the honor, and the reputation of the United States government and its armed forces; and they can apparently hold the whole Red Army at bay.". The military value of such commitments is infinitesimal in comparison to their symbolism.

Although this quote was in reference to the Berlin Blockade of 1948, it holds true to this day according to bipartisan research. The National Defense Commission found that: "If the United States desires to avoid military conflict in these regions it should ensure there is a capable day-to-day posture in both theaters to deter adversaries and engage in prompt escalation control". Strengthening America's commitment to the sovereignty of the Republic of China should be seen as a move that counters the risk of conflict by providing a strong deterrent to attack on an independent state instead of aggressive U.S. expansionism aiming to encroach on Chinese territory. Ronald Reagan's 'Peace through Strength' policy should very much be at the forefront of modern U.S. strategy.

The Quad

Recently the United States pledged to supply up to a billion Coronavirus vaccine doses across Asia by 2022 with the help of its three closest Indo-Pacific allies, India, Australia and Japan during a meeting of the Quad. This move, which was carefully choreographed to be a move countering Chinese foreign policy, is a perfect example as to how a group of like-minded countries with stakes in the Indo-Pacific region can upend China's mission of engulfing small nations into its sphere of influence whilst improving relations with strategically significant international partners. It was only on March 12 of this year that this previously insignificant group came into the spotlight with a virtual conference in which these plans were announced. The Quad announced that they would cooperate with each other more in terms of maritime security, global warming and investment.

Participation in such an organization and the strengthening of such an organization by the United States is vital. The United States will be able to assure, with the help of its allies in the region, that The Quad can make good on its promise to keep the Indo-Pacific "free, open, inclusive and resilient" (from and to aggressive Chinese expansionism). It is only the United States that can provide the military and economic security required to 'hold the line' in the face of an incensed Chinese reaction. 

The Quad will be an important stepping-stone to rebuilding recognition of the United States as a powerful broker in the Indo-Pacific and potentially allow for the establishment of an independent trading organization that gives the United States influence over other countries' trade relations (towards China) whilst giving less powerful nations better options for stable trading partners. However, I would be remiss if I were not to point out the dangers of a close economic and security partnership between countries who seek to coordinate policy with each other. The purpose of such a group is not to become an Asian version of the European Union and risk the populations of respective member's countries feeling that their country's sovereignty was being in any way violated. Instead, this group exists for the sole purpose of balancing the scale against the Chinese behemoth and attempt to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific domain.

Rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership

President Donald Trump, in his first week in the White House, withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in a presidential memorandum. The reasoning for this action was that it would undermine the U.S.'s economic independence, and that it was an unfair and poorly negotiated deal. He was supported by unlikely allies such as Bernie Sanders who also believe that being part of such a multilateral trade agreement would harm the interests of the American worker, so it would be incorrect to assume that the Republican Party is to blame for such a misstep, both Democrats and Republicans need to see the bigger picture. Although the agreement would most likely have opened up the United States to higher levels of foreign competition, it took the most important signatory out of the agreement and opened up the floor to Chinese exploitation. Without the backing of the United States, the scale is now tipped in China's favor.

The agreement permitted the United States to keep an eye on, and have a say in, the trading relationship between tactically significant countries and China, an invaluable tool. Much like the role of the aforementioned 'Quad', the TPP could be used to balance the scale against China by having a 'united front' for trade. This 'united front' would be effective in containing Chinese economic expansionism by preventing China from bullying individually small economies into submission, instead forcing it to engage in negotiations with a bloc of countries with much larger economic significance. The agreement also mandated the international regulation of issues U.S. businesses have been raising against China for decades, in particular the strict enforcing of intellectual property law.

Withdrawing from such an agreement brought into question the commitment the United States has to maintaining the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' that was emphasized in President Joe Biden's address on the 12 March of this year. Rejoining multilateral agreements such as the TPP is crucial in securing the relevance and influence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

One Step Back, Two Steps Forward

China has made it abundantly clear that one of the key benefits of accepting its loans and participating in the Belt and Road initiative is that China will not attempt to push 'universal' or 'western' values onto those seeking loans from the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. This is in stark contrast to the International Monetary Fund's management style.

The United States, the largest contributor to the IMF, has huge influence in deciding which countries have access to IMF loans. Often, countries which do not meet certain human rights or democracy standards are rejected outright from the application process. This is problematic, countries which do not qualify for IMF loans can simply seek funds from the AIIB, circumventing U.S. and western interference and oversight entirely. The United States and its allies will need to accept that to make progress in forming a stable coalition against China, it will need to lower its standards in terms of which countries are eligible for IMF loans.

This is a difficult proposition to make but, what is the point in succeeding in an ideological battle when the real battle, the economic war, is being lost? To move forward the United States and its allies need to move backwards first. The United States and IMF need to accept that to make progress against the AIIB, it needs to set aside its principles of morality and loosen its criteria for loan/aid eligibility in countries that have potentially questionable human rights records.

Conclusion

The Unites States has come to a point where it simply cannot continue to conduct its foreign policy with such shortsightedness. Although this generalization doesn't hold true for the entire period between 1994 and the present, the last four years have shown that rising tempers and displays of defiance towards China is not an appropriate strategy, it in fact exacerbates the problem. What the U.S.A. now needs is a policy which isn't necessarily anti-China, but rather a policy that is pro-America.

President Joe Biden recently said this about the U.S.' relationship with Russia after his summit with President Vladimir Putin. Like the Russians, the Chinese area proud people and Joe Biden needs to make clear to China that, like with Russia, the U.S. is simply acting to serve its best interests, not seeking to harm the interests of China, in order to avoid any open hostility. On the other hand, Biden needs to show that the United States is prepared to defend its interests via a buildup of both hard and soft diplomatic power in the region, following the Reagan Doctrine.

Building international support, re-thinking policies and bold proposals are what's going to be necessary for the U.S. to win the hidden war against China. This shouldn't worry President Biden however, as his entire presidential campaign was built on overthrowing the status quo of Trump and re-imagining America's potential. Before he can do this however, Joe Biden has to restore the United States' reputation as a deal broker and deal maker, whilst keeping the domestic climate in the United States docile and handling crises that have developed under his watch, which will surely undermine the United States internationally. Once these are done, America can once again begin to lead in the Indo-Pacific and the globe.

References:


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