16th December 1944, western Europe. Hitler launches his last great gamble in the west. Fanatical Nazi soldiers were unleashed on unsuspecting Americans resting far away from where they thought the fighting would take place. The Battle of the Bulge was underway.
This film explains the key role that the controversial victor of El-Alamein, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, played in defeating Adolf Hitler's bold surprise attack and his controversial saving of American blushes. Yet it was enormously controversial.
This is the previously untold hidden story of Field Marshal Montgomery and his British led victory over Hitler's ruthless counteroffensive. This epic confrontation that we know today as the Battle of the Bulge.
Hitler's plan was to sweep the lightly armed and resting G.I.s aside then head straight for Field Marshal Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and head for the coast taking the British port of Antwerp in Belgium through which the Allied armies were receiving their vital supplies and the weapons which would be used to drive into the heart of Hitler's Third Reich. The Führer hoped, nay fantasised, that this veritable blitzkrieg would physically shatter the unity between British led forces under Monty, as he was affectionately known, and those of their American cousins occupying land to the south. Hitler hoped that separating British and American forces would break asunder Anglo-American political unity and psychologically lead to a divide between the two great western powers. This was hope beyond hope. Yet what was real was that victory in this counteroffensive for Hitler would have bought him and his minions time to organize a defence against the Red Army advancing on his Reich from the East. It would have also hampered Allied operations, restricted their supplies, and bring much death and destruction, almost without answer as Hitler's cunning plan connived to attack when atmospheric conditions in the rolling hills of the Ardennes created fog that would ground the Allies airpower and give the Nazis a freehand to advance without fear of attack from above.
Monty's Army Group, and the territory they occupied, were not the only targets. There were also rumours of German assassination squads that had been sent to kill the British Field Marshal. And an attack from the Luftwaffe in support of the German ground offensive destroyed Montgomery's personal transport plane, which had been gifted to him by General Eisenhower for the duration of the war.
Field Marshal Montgomery, was playing golf. In search of light relief, he had flown to Eindhoven, landing on a fairway. Monty had arranged to meet the professional golf player Dai Rees. Almost as soon as they had begun their game, Montgomery received a scratchy report of a major German assault on the US First Army. Although this army was not under Montgomery's command, he flew back to his tactical HQ in Zonhoven from where he could act. He sent officers to liaise with American commanders, and the British officers found their base abandoned.Earlier that morning, American commanders thought the Germans were as good as beaten. British commander Bernard Law Montgomery knew otherwise. The famous Field Marshal had months before raised the alarm, telling the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, of the threat. Monty's warnings were not heeded, and tens of thousands of American soldiers paid the ultimate price.
Prior to the battle Montgomery was becoming concerned about the increasing number of US casualties, which were causing a shortage of manpower in Bradley's 12th Army Group which, like Monty's 12th Army Group, similarly suffered supply problems such as a shortage of ammunition. Due to resources being split between the different unconnected and diverging thrusts, which were part of Eisenhower's broad front strategy which involved the Allies attempting to attack along the entirety of the western front. An approach that guaranteed that the western Allies had not been able to breach or bypass the fixed German defences called the Westwall which guarded the Fatherland. Worse still, an enormous weakness had opened up in US lines.
Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group were in a strong position and represented a powerful and cohesive front. Yet further south US forces were positioned with a gap of around 100 miles in their defences which covered the Ardennes. They were not ready for combat against the mighty host that was soon to bear down on them. This was the weakest part of the American line, and the German blow was scheduled to fall right on it; cutting General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group in half. On 28th November 1944 Montgomery had warned Eisenhower about this, suggesting that Patton's Third Army should be moved north to not only fill the gap, but also to engage and destroy the Sixth Panzer Army, the most powerful Axis mobile force in the country, the failure to heed that advice was to have grave consequences.
After the Second World War Eisenhower was open about the tactical failings that allowed the Germans to seize the initiative. He wrote:
'The responsibility for maintaining only four divisions on the Ardennes front and for running the risk of a large German penetration in that area was mine… This plan gave the Germans opportunity to launch his attack against a weak portion of our lines.'
The force which Hitler put into the field was a major one and consisted of a total of twenty-four divisions, ten of which were panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. These were in three armies: the Fifth Panzer Army, the Sixth Panzer Army, and the Seventh Army. At the start of the fighting there were 200,000 German men-at-arms and at the height of the engagement, the Reich fielded half-a-million men in this great struggle.
Both the Fifth and the Sixth Panzer Armies contained well equipped armoured Waffen-SS (armed SS) units; this was the military wing of the Nazi Party. Its soldiers were highly motivated and believed in the cause of National Socialism. However, the Seventh Army was an understrength formation. It was primarily made up of infantry from the regular German army known as the Heer. One such unit was called the Stomach Division because it consisted of those who were ill with abdominal sickness, but just well enough to fight, or at least become cannon fodder. The Seventh Army was to all intents and purposes a diversion and intended to tie up Allied forces as they pushed south-west. The other much more powerful formations were headed north-east, aiming for Montgomery.
Despite the Seventh Army's problems, the building up of such a massive strategic reserve and the supplying of tanks to the Fifth and Sixth armies was a major accomplishment, especially after the severe losses which were inflicted on the Nazis when fighting in France earlier in the summer of 1944. Montgomery was the commander of the Allied armies on D-Day and in the subsequent 81 following days that were the Battle of Normandy.
The fighting began on 16th December 1944 with a powerful artillery barrage aimed at the American front line. The Allies were also hit with Hitler's cunning plan to disrupt US forces behind their own lines. This did succeed in creating initial confusion, but the German operatives were soon identified and executed. Nevertheless, shocked and nearly overawed Americans were pushed aside as Hitler's panzers raced towards Montgomery's forces in Belgium.
During the opening days of the battle Montgomery closely monitored the situation. Modelling his battlefield communications upon a system established by the Duke of Wellington at Battle of Waterloo, Montgomery established a team of liaison officers that kept him informed of developments as the Germans attacked the Americans. Monty quickly saw that General Omar Bradley's American 12th Army group had been cut in two by the onslaught. Recognising the seriousness of the situation he immediately made sure that the rear and southern flanks of the 21st Army Group, which was to the north of the German advance, was secure in case of a complete German breakthrough. Montgomery's armies had been preparing to engage the Germans in a battle to secure the Rhineland. He stopped this and began moving British forces into a position that would halt any German advance beyond the Meuse.
Eisenhower, in agreement with Bradley, instead of waiting for reinforcements was pushing the attacks 'to the extreme limit of our ability, and it was this decision that was responsible for the startling successes of the first week of the German December attacks.' However, that was all about to change.
Montgomery sent troops south to gain more information and to prepare defences on the bridges over the Meuse from Liege to Givet. He also engaged the elite troops of the Special Air Service (SAS) in these operations sending them with the forces that he scraped together – staff from a tank replacement station – to the Namur-Giyet area. Monty also established armoured car patrols to keep communications open between Liege and Namur. He also rushed 29 Armoured Brigade from Western Belgium to the Namur zone. Montgomery ordered them to move as quickly as possible.
From the very start of the Battle of the Bulge Montgomery had been urging Eisenhower to keep the American focus on the fighting in the Ardennes by putting the US forces far to the south, near to the Swiss border, on to the defensive. Monty was also suggesting that General Patton's Third Army should cancel its planned attack and immediately move north to attack the German's southern flank. This would rebalance the American forces along the lines Monty had been suggesting since the autumn.
On 18th December, with the German thrusts succeeding in advancing 20 miles into US lines, Eisenhower finally took Montogomery's advice He ordered a halt to the offensive in the south and sought to plug the gap through which the Germans were pouring by ordering the Third Army to counterattack the southern flank of the now rapidly expanding bulge. However, the Allies were being forced to fight the Germans when the Nazis had the initiative, under Montgomery's plan the Americans would have taken the offensive first and catch Hitler off-guard. That would have prevented the Führer's forces from achieving the element of surprise. To make sure that US soldiers were better balanced, the Seventh Army was also moved further north to make the American 12th Army Group a more cohesive force, a move alsosuggested by Montgomery prior to the battle.
Just three days into the battle the Nazis had reached as far as La Roche-en-Ardenne, Marche and Hotton; creating a salient from Bastogne to Durbuy. In the event of a further American collapse Montgomery established units to secure the roads around the Belgian capital. Montgomery had now secured the area and was in a position to repel any German attack that crossed the Meuse.
Despite making his own preparations Monty was still just an interested observer in the main battle to the south of his command. This, however, was about to change. On 20th December just 30 minutes before Monty was to begin an 11am conference with his two subordinate commanders in the 21st Army Group, Generals Crerar and Dempsey, he received a telephone call from General Eisenhower giving him overall command of all American forces north of the Bulge. This was General Simpson's US Ninth Army and General Hodges' First Army. They were under the overall direction of Bradley, but he had effectively lost control of these two armies as they had been cut-off from his headquarters in Luxembourg.
The decision on 20th December to place these two armies under Monty's command was originally suggested by General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. According to the American army officer and military historian, Hugh Marshall Cole, this change of command, 'must have been difficult to make, since both Eisenhower and Smith were acutely conscious of the smoldering animosity toward the British in general and Montgomery in particular which existed in the 12th Army Group and Third Army, not to mention the chronic anti-British sentiment which might be anticipated from some circles in Washington.'
That same day Monty gave instructions to Simpson to meet him at First Army's HQ which Montgomery set out for at 12 noon. First Army were being subjected to vicious hammer blows from the German advance. Despite the desperate situation, the two isolated American armies had been neglected by General Bradley, who had failed to visit his two subordinates, nor even seek to coordinate the resistance of the two armies that were engaged with the Germans on the northern shoulder of the advance. Montgomery entered the headquarters displaying his characteristic self-confidence. This attitude had been important to turning around the fortunes of the British Eighth Army in North Africa in 1942 where he came in brimming with confidence and rebuilt the morale of this beleaguered force that had suffered many defeats at the hands of Rommel but from then on the Eight Army knew only victory.
Eisenhower kept Monty informed as to the unfolding situation in the other areas and sought his advice. When Ike spoke to Montgomery via radio, he was thinking of his earlier conference with his American Commanders where he said that the Battle of the Bulge was a good opportunity for the Allies. He had said that "the present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster." He then said to Montgomery, "Our weakest spot is in the direction of Namur. The general plan is to plug the holes in the north and launch co-ordinated attack from the south. Later on, Eisenhower contacted Montgomery again, asking him to "Please let me have your personal appreciation of the situation on the north flank with reference to the possibility of giving up, if necessary, some ground in order to shorten our line and collect a strong reserve for the purpose of destroying the enemy in Belgium." Eisenhower recognised that the main danger to the Americans was on the northern shoulder. What is more, intelligence reports suggested that there may be more attacks further to the north to attempt what is known as a double envelopment of the allied forces in that sector.
Seeing the northern shoulder of the German advance as a complete front, rather than individual units trying to hold their ground, Monty reorganised the Allied war machine. Montgomery and his Supreme Commander both agreed as to how the conflict should be handled. With the complete support of General Eisenhower, Montgomery, in characteristic fashion, visited his subordinates, appraised the situation, developed a strategy, and then put his plan into action. Monty initially identified strong defensive points where the thrust could be stopped and reinforced strategic areas. Simultaneously, Montgomery began the process of building up American reserves that could take part in a counterattack when deemed effective. To this end he decided that the VII Corps of the US First Army should become the reserve force that can take the offensive. They mustered to the north-west of the Belgian town of Marche. This was to prove a useful place for this rested and regrouped corps as they were soon to play an important part in the fighting.
British soldiers first took part in this conflict when Montgomery joined them to the Ninth Army to bolster its defence and allow the Ninth to take over part of the territory defended by First Army. This action stabilised the front line.
General Bradley visited Montgomery at his Headquarters on Christmas Day to consult with the British Field Marshal. At this meeting Bradley received a dressing down from Montgomery for his part in allowing this sorry situation to develop. Montgomery said,
"it was entirely our fault we had gone too far with our right; we had tried to develop two thrusts at the same time, and neither had been strong enough to gain decisive results. The enemy saw his chance and took it. Now we were in a proper muddle".
On 27th December 1945, Monty went to see Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks commander of XXX Corps, part of the British Second Army, to make sure his units would hold the Meuse between Namur and Louvain. Horrocks had different ideas. Noticing that the site of the 1815 Battle of Waterloo was close by, Horrocks suggested that the Germans should be allowed to cross the strategically important river Meuse and reach the Belgium town of Waterloo. Then he could deliver a victory over the Germans on the same field where Wellington defeated Napoleon. Montgomery disagreed with his long-serving and loyal subordinate, and Monty ordered Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, the commander of Second Army, to make sure that Horrocks did not allow any Germans to get beyond the river Meuse.
The next day, on 28th December, Eisenhower visited Montgomery in the Belgian city of Hasselt. At this meeting Monty kept Eisenhower informed about the attacks which he was making against the northern flank of the bulge. He also gave the Supreme Commander the details on the build-up of the forces that were to be used in the offensive directed towards the town of Houffalize in the centre of the salient which the Germans had recently created in the Ardennes Offensive. Whilst the forces for this counter blow were being prepared Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed that the strategy was to prepare for a renewed German attack, Allied intelligence predicted that this would come in the north.
By New Year's Eve 1944 General Horrock's XXX Corps had captured Rochefort, blunting the German advance and also beginning the process of driving the Nazis back, within the space of a few days.
Previously historians have thought that Montgomery only began offensive action in January yet the attacks of XXX Corps show that this long-held belief is not correct. These attacks were however limited by the fact that the need to commit the US VII Corps to the battle and the sheer ferocity of the fighting on the northern shoulder of the German advance meant that there were few reserves to use in the counterstrike. To create the forces that Montgomery needed to drive the Germans back, and out, of the bulge. Monty moved XXX Corps to the area between Givet in France, and Hotton in Belgium. This transfer was concluded on 2nd January 1945 and enabled VII Corps to move towards the strategic town of Houffalize.In this action they intended to link up with the Third Army's advance coming from the south.
On 3rd January,VII Corps began its attacks. The Germans, despite being forced to abandon their mobile warfare, were not about to admit defeat and retreat. Through using anti-tank weapons and even tanks, they had learned how to go over to the defensive and deny the Allies their advance. What's more , on 3rd January the appalling weather, which marred the winter of 1944/45, returned. This restricted visibility to no more than several hundred yards. Despite those conditions an advance of approaching several miles was made. However, the offensive had to be halted for two days after a severe snowstorm.
XXX Corps launched another attack with two divisions on 4th January and continued to bludgeon back the furthest advance into the bulge. The British 6th Airborne Division, which had been rushed to the scene, joined the attack. The Belgium village of Bure was taken by 5th January.
The offensive by VII Corps began again after two days on 5th January and despite there still being bad weather VII Corps, supported by the US XVIII Airborne Corps, had achieved much success. They seized territory south-east of Grandmenil cutting the road between Vielsalm and La Roche-en-Ardenne which the Germans were relying upon to supply their forces in the north. The 82nd Airborne Division reached the villages of Vielsalm and Salmchâteau on 7th January. Whilst VII Corps were attacking there was a simultaneous offensive from the British 53rd Division which took Grimbiermont and the strategically important heights to the east of the town on 7th January. The situation for the Germans in the north had deteriorated massively.
Monty was directing his forces in the north towards Houffalize, and the resistance from the Germans was stiff. To keep up the momentum Monty put 51st Armoured Division into the fight, taking point from 53rd Division. They had the immediate objective of advancing towards La-Roche-en-Ardenne and Champlon in southern Belgium.
Monty set the river Ourthe, which runs from near Houffalize to Liège where it joins up with the Meuse, as the limit of XXX Corp's advance. La-Roche-en-Ardenne was liberated on 10th January. The 6th Airborne Division reached Saint-Hubert on 11th January and linked up with the western side of Third Army.
On 13th January the situation was so desperate for the Germans that the town of Saint Vith was being approached by XVIII Airborne Corps who were attacking from the west. The devastated town was finally retaken by the allies on 23rd January 1945. The 51st Armoured Division was also breaking out from La-Roche-en-Ardenne and advancing south.
As the Battle of the Bulge entered its final phase with victory just a few days away Montgomery went to lengths to try and get on with his American opposite number, Omar Bradley and his subordinate General Patton. On 14th January, Monty wrote to General Bradley. His message
read,
'My dear Brad,
It does seem as if the battle of the 'salient' will shortly be drawing to a close, and when it is all clean and tidy I imagine that your armies will be returning to your operational command.
I would like to say two things:
First: What a great honour it has been for me to command such fine troops.
Second: How well they have all done.
It has been a great pleasure to work with Hodges and Simpson; both have done very well.
And the Corps Commanders in the First Army (Gerow, Collins, Ridgeway) have been quite magnificent; it must be most exceptional to find such a good lot of Corps Commanders gathered together in one Army.
All of us in the northern side of the salient would like to say how much we have admired the operations that have been conducted on the southern side; if you had not held on firmly to Bastogne the whole situation might have become very awkward.
My kind regards to you and to George Patton.
Yrs very sincerely,
B L Montgomery'
On 16th January, Third and First armies linked up at Houffalize and the Allies then drove east eliminating the German salient as they went, retaking much of the land that had been lost in the opening days of the conflict. Monty's and Bradley's American forces now ultimately aimed to push the Germans further back behind the lines from where they had started the Battle of the Bulge. The battle was now effectively won, Montgomery then wrote to General Eisenhower. His letter read,
'I have great pleasure in reporting to you that the task you gave me in the Ardennes is now concluded. First and Third Armies have joined hands at Houffalize and are advancing eastwards. It can therefore be said that we have now achieved tactical victory within the salient. I am returning First Army to Bradley tomorrow as ordered by you. I would like to say what a great pleasure it has been to have such a splendid army under my command and how very well it has done.'
On 17th January Eisenhower replied to Montgomery, writing as follows,
'Thank you again for the way you pitched in to help out during the German thrust. Some day I hope I can show my appreciation in a more lasting manner.'
By 18th January, as well as the forces advancing east from Houffalize, in the north the First Army was driving eastwards from Stavelot and Malmedy towards the area between Monschau and Saint Vith. And in the South the Third Army was approaching Vianden from the south-west.
Following the Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery moved the British troops that were taking part out of operations to support the Americans in the Ardennes and repositioned those crown forces to prepare for the subjugation of the Rhineland.
Despite most Allied soldiers taking part in the Battle of Bulge being American, British forces did play an important part in the victory. They allowed for hard-pressed US troops to be withdrawn from the fray and reform as a strategic reserve that could strike back against the Germans and make the Nazis pay for their reckless attack. The greatest single British contribution remained Montgomery himself and his calm and collected leadership of both British and American troops that were put under his command.
Germany, outgunned and outthought, would have lost the Second World War regardless of whether or not the Battle of the Bulge was fought.
Hitler's plan in the Battle of the Bugle had been to divide and conquer Britain and America. Physically separating the British commanded forces from those from the United States would, he hoped, lead to a political division. This was almost a reality when misreported and misunderstood comments from Montgomery nearly resulted in a schism between Montgomery and the Americans.
On 7th January 1945 Montgomery held a press conference to stop the reports in the British press that were criticising Eisenhower's handling of the war which had arguably allowed this crisis to develop. Monty had approval to hold the press conference from the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.
The final and most salient points in his talk to the assembled press were intended to plead for the journalists not to damage "Allied solidarity". He explained to them that,
"It is team-work that pulls you through dangerous times; it is team-work that wins battles; it is victories in battle that win wars… Nothing must be done by anyone that tends to break down the team spirit of our Allied team; if you try and 'get at' the captain of the team you are liable to induce a loss of confidence, and this may spread and have disastrous results. I would say that anyone who tries to break up the team spirit of the Allies is definitely helping the enemy. Let me tell you that the captain of our team is Eisenhower. I am absolutely devoted to Ike; we are the greatest of friends. It grieves me when I see uncomplimentary articles about him in the British press; he bears a great burden, he needs our fullest support, he has a right to expect it, and it is up to all of us to see that he gets it."
How could such a press conference result in such controversy? The team spirit did not stretch as far as some American generals such as the overtly Anglophobe General Patton and his commander General Bradley, who was almost equally suspicious of the British and still smarting from losing two whole armies when Eisenhower placed them under Monty's command.
Montgomery did praise the GIs stating quite clearly that "Rundstedt was really beaten by the good fighting qualities of the American soldier and by the team-work of the Allies." He went further in paying tribute to the Americans, explaining his high opinion of the American soldier. Stating, "He is a brave fighting man, steady under fire, and with that tenacity in battle which stamps the first class soldier… I salute the brave fighting men of America; I never want to fight alongside better soldiers… "
Yet that was not enough to appease Montgomery's opposite numbers in command of other American armies in the field whom, apart from Eisenhower, he had failed to mention. This omission from his briefing was an oversight that was to rankle US commanders.
Montgomery also said that "The battle has been most interesting; I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake." Describing the battle as "interesting" was seen as being disrespectful to the 80,000 casualties that the American's had suffered in what was for them a desperate and bloody battle.
Whilst the American generals were dejected after the mauling they had suffered; Montgomery appeared to them to be victorious over the Americans when in reality Monty was jubilant that he had beaten the Germans.
Whereas Eisenhower and his American subordinates had left themselves open to a military attack, Montgomery's press conference had also left him open to a cunning German attack. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, seized on a report to the BBC about the press conference from the Australian war correspondent, Chester Wilmot. The transmission was then re-worked to make Monty's words appear to be anti-American and then aired by the German propaganda machine. Staff in General Bradley's Headquarters heard the fake news report and fell for the trick. Believing that the distorted words were a BBC broadcast the anger was unleashed which then took on its own momentum.
That being the case Montgomery still regretted holding the press conference, saying;
"So great was the feeling against me on the part of the American generals, that whatever I said was bound to be wrong. I should therefore have said nothing."
Whereas many American Generals thought that Monty had intentionally demeaned them, Eisenhower 'did not believe that Montgomery meant his words as they sounded.' Yet the strength of feeling was so great that the other American generals began a campaign of voicing 'reciprocal scorn and contempt.' It seems that this lasted for many years.
Attempts were made to write both his, and his country's, contribution out of history. Aghast at American men serving under a British commander, in an act of pique some Americans orchestrated a fight back against Monty which was almost as vigorous as the one they had deployed in Battle of the Bulge. Why then had he caused such a reaction?
To serve under Monty was a great experience, subordinates were consulted and kept. To serve alongside or be his superior was a markedly different experience. He did not suffer fools gladly. Yet that is not the only cause of why such vitriol a poured on his good name.
Leaving personal feelings aside, ultimately the real long-term struggles was over who would rule Western Europe once the Nazis were gone. Would it be Britain or America? America had all but superseded the old-world powers and was in the process of putting the British Empire in the shade. Post-war prestige was important. America was a country that lauded success and saw the need for posterity to recognise the young country's emergence as the preeminent global power and world policeman.
Some egocentric American generals were not about to have the sheen taken off their war record. But they were not all as one, those that had the honour of serving under Montgomery's command were not fully reading from the script. Montgomery did win plaudits for his handling of the Battle of the Bulge. Bradley recognised his "notable contribution". Fulsome praise also came from the American Major General Matt Ridgway. He was the commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps. He wrote to Montgomery and his letter read,
'It has been an honoured privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving you in pursuit of a common goal.'
Monty's opponents were overawed by his successful prosecution of the battle. The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, General Hasso von Manteuffel, commented on Montgomery's role in the Battle of the Bulge stating;
"The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough."
Montgomery won the battle but lost the propaganda war. The American press, and Hollywood, snatched the plaudits from him.
The scars ran deep. Despite Monty's contribution being decisive even he, a renowned self-publicist, was reluctant to talk about it after the Second World War. In his memoirs he wrote, 'I think the less one says about this battle the better, for I fancy that whatever I do say will almost certainly be resented.'
