By Christopher Gill
As a Christian and also as a fervent believer in the vital importance and inestimable value of free speech I am more than a little concerned about the prospect of legislation being introduced to give Islam protections that are not enjoyed by any other religion in modern Britain.
In point of fact the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel were abolished in England and Wales in 2008 and in Scotland in 2024.
As is well known, a committee under the chairmanship of former Conservative Attorney General, Dominic Grieve KC, is currently charged with the responsibility of coming up with a definition of Islamophobia and I fear that once that happens there will be a headlong rush to implement enabling legislation.
From a religious point of view I feel that what I am concerned about is no more than an open and shut case. Why, particularly in the context of the relatively recent action taken in the British and Scottish parliaments to abolish blasphemy laws, should we even be thinking about making an exception for Islam?
Dominic Grieve may be a clever lawyer but devising a definition of Islamophobia that is going to be broadly acceptable to all sections of society might well be said to be a task that would defy the wisdom of Solomon!
But, even supposing that a satisfactory definition is arrived at, what then is going to be the reaction of the general public to the prospect of legislation favouring what is currently perceived by substantial numbers of the indigenous population to be a religion that is openly intolerant of non-Muslims and other religions?
As far as I am aware Islam is unique amongst the various religions practised in the UK in that it is the only one that threatens its apostates with death!
Another distinguishing feature of Islam is that not only is it an aggressively proselytising religion but, again uniquely, also a political force that aims to replace the host country's justice system.
Britain has a long and proud tradition of tolerance towards and acceptance of minorities and dissenting religions but it is only fair to point out that very many of our fellow countrymen are unlikely to accept that militant Islam, which is increasingly seen as a political entity with a colonising agenda, is in anyway comparable to the minorities that we have in times past so peaceably and successfully assimilated.
I now turn to the practical effects and consequences of legislating in a manner that will be perceived as being in direct conflict with the all-important and time-honoured principle of Free Speech.
I start from the standpoint that as a British subject it is an intrinsic part of my birthright that I am free to express myself in absolutely any way I choose, with but one simple proviso. That proviso is that I must not say anything which is specifically banned by legislation passed in the Mother of Parliaments.
To now say there is going to be an exception to that long-standing and well-understood feature of the British way of life drives a coach and horses through an over-arching tenet of our jurisdiction that has heretofore served us so well.
In the event of legislation to outlaw Islamophobia reaching the statute book my immediate concern is as to who then will interpret that legislation or who, in other words, will be the final arbiter as to whether what is uttered is acceptable or unacceptable - is it to be the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the courts of law, a specifically appointed commission, politicians, aggrieved members of the public - just who or what is going to replace the court of public opinion?
As an aside I would just mention that it is in effect the court of public opinion which, at election time, actually determines who governs us!
But, above all else, the singular feature of the court of public opinion is that it cannot be coerced.
Admittedly it can be influenced by advertising and/or propaganda but its independence and its innate good sense should never be underestimated. In my experience the British people know when the wool is being pulled over their eyes and although they may not necessarily be able to articulate their opinions very well they instinctively recognise when something is wrong.
It follows therefore that if someone is rash enough to say something that is, for whatever reason, outrageous that person will, in the eyes of the public, be generally discredited, but the very idea that anyone should be prevented from, or prosecuted for, saying something offensive is a concept that in my opinion is in itself offensive.
Whichever way you slice it, silencing our precious right of free speech on one or more topics would be a departure entirely alien to our modern British culture.
I now turn to the hazard of unintended consequences.
Almost inevitably legislation is prone to creating unintended consequences. Human nature being what it is, people will always seek inventive ways around irksome laws which, with the best will in the world, those who draft our legislation are seldom able to anticipate.
Back in the day, when the nation's 'balance of payments' was of topical concern, the Government imposed a limit of £50 on the amount of money that we as individuals could take out of the country. It would have needed great ministerial foresight to anticipate that this particular piece of financial legislation would spawn the package holiday industry which has never looked back.
A perhaps more pertinent example is the European Convention on Human Rights, dating back to 1950. That was intended as a bulwark against a recurrence of the horrendous human rights abuses that occurred prior to and during the course of World War 2, but which is now routinely invoked by human rights lawyers to frustrate Government efforts to deport convicted criminals - for Convention read Circumvention!
In conclusion, I have little doubt that, quite apart from being unfair and unwarranted, a law to proscribe Islamophobia would give rise to many unintended consequences as vexatious clerics and wily lawyers sought to exploit its provisions.
This is quite apart from the fact that by dint of the existing Public Order Act (1986) it simply is not necessary, as amply demonstrated in the case of Rex v Hamit Coskum )Westminster Magistrates Court, June 2nd 2025).
Whether in his landmark judgement District Judge John McGarva was successful in avoiding the hazard of conflating 'racism' with 'religious hatred' is perhaps something that will be argued over for months to come.
I fully recognise that the advent of social media is a complicating factor in matters affecting freedom of speech but nevertheless the fundamental principles remain unchanged.
What one does by silencing the individual is to cede the field to bullies and despots and if history teaches us anything at all it is that that way lies perdition!
